As illustrated by liquidity support, equity injections and asset repurchases in financial crises and by IMF credit lines to countries, authorities often intervene in order to revive markets that have dried up or to create new ones. In such situations, agents participate only if they receive from the governmental scheme more than in the marketplace, while the market outcome depends on who joins the scheme. The paper provides a first analysis of market jumpstarting and its two-way interaction between mechanism design and participation constraints.
Introduction

Motivation
One of the most damaging market failures is the evaporation of trust and the dryup of markets. The recent crisis is a case in point. Prior to it, many institutions had relied on market and funding liquidity to meet their liquidity needs. They encountered severe refinancing problems when asset and money markets grounded to a halt.
While authorities tried to convince the public that the market turmoil was a short-lived one, players with excess liquidity started in the summer of 2007 to refuse to buy assets or lend to other institutions, whose quality they questioned. The panic in the commercial paper market and other markets intensified with Lehman's collapse. The flight to quality then left even solid institutions such as Goldman Sachs or top European banks bleeding funding. Most markets collapsed very quickly, including the subprime and Alt-A markets which had totalled $815 billion in 2006. In reaction to this dry up, authorities chose to inject funds into the financial sector through two channels: asset repurchases (or bad bank schemes), and lending or recapitalization.
Toxic asset repurchases aim at cleaning up balance sheets, thereby allowing sellers to re-start with a clean slate. The purchase of toxic assets, it is argued, has the further benefit of jump starting the asset market by transferring the most toxic pieces to the government. 1 This approach was at the heart of the TARP I and II plans, and was also recommended by the IMF. While the substantial amounts earmarked in the TARP plans for asset repurchases never served this purpose, authorities accepted potentially toxic assets as collateral (for example through TALF, the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility).
An alternative approach to revitalizing the flow of credit leaves assets on the sellers' balance sheet and proceeds to some form of loans or recapitalization (purchase of preferred shares, guarantees on interbank lending, loans through various facilities, etc.). Regardless of the specificities of the intervention, its thrust is the government's taking a stake in the ongoing entities, and not only in a subset of assets of questionable quality.
These interventions share two key characteristics: a) They react to market freezes in situations in which trust in the quality of assets or/and counterparties evaporates. b) They are by and large voluntary (presumably because of possible allegations of expropriation and lawsuits). Institutions were free to use the discount window or the various other facilities put in place during the crisis; they would have chosen whether to part with their assets under the TARP I and II plans. 2 This paper offers a first formal analysis of market revival. Its key insight, and one that departs from standard mechanism design theory, goes as follows: Because participation in government market rejuvenation schemes is voluntary, institutions participate in the scheme only if what they receive in it exceeds what they obtain in the marketplace. However, the market outcome depends on who participates in the government scheme. Put differently, reservation utilities in the mechanism designed by the government depend on the mechanism itself.
The two-way interaction between mechanism design and participation constraints is not merely of theoretical interest, but is central to the policy debate. For example, a premise of the US Treasury plans for asset repurchases was that they would not be very costly to the US taxpayers; authorities as well as a number of observers indeed argued that as financial institutions were desperate to raise cash, assets were "undervalued". Governments, the argument went, would intervene where current market values most differed from the fundamentals, and so governments' involvement in asset repurchases could even turn a profit. Conversely, other observers (e.g., Bebchuk, Buiter, Krugman and Sachs) expressed concern about the plans' potential cost to the taxpayer. This paper articulates their concerns and argues that the optimistic view ignores the fact that if the Treasury's plan has been successful and had purged the market from its most toxic assets, the resulting market rejuvenation would have had the effect of boosting asset prices, and thereby of making asset owners reluctant to depart from their assets. Put differently, a successful intervention would have necessarily been ex-pensive.
The idea that participants in a scheme have an eye on the subsequent free market has other applications. Sellers are reluctant to show up at the discount window and countries have shunned the IMF's CCL (contingent credit line) mechanism by fear of the stigma associated with participation in those schemes, or, equivalently, in search of the positive signal sent by non-participation. 3 Private sector applications will be mentioned in the concluding remarks. Finally, we note that the same analysis can be applied to the analysis of market creation and not only rejuvenation.
Description of the model and results
To capture the idea that, through a selection effect, those who participate in a mechanism define the utility of those who do not, we study a simple model (described in Section 2) in which a cashless seller wants to finance a known positive net-presentvalue project. The financial market is competitive, but agency costs in this project (moral hazard in the model) imply that the seller is credit-constrained; accordingly, she must sell a share or the totality of a legacy asset. Potential buyers however are imperfectly informed about the quality θ ∈ Θ of this legacy asset.
We first characterize the laissez-faire outcome for an arbitrary distribution of types.
Either the market for the legacy asset freezes; the seller is then never able to finance the project. Or the market enables the refinancing of part or all of the population of types.
We then introduce a government. The government maximizes a mixture of seller and taxpayer welfares, and is hesitant to leave large rents to sellers. The government moves first and proposes a mechanism. Sellers then choose to participate or stay out. In contrast with standard mechanism design, though, we allow non-participating sellers to benefit from the potential market rebound induced by the government's intervention. In this marketplace, sellers obtain the market outcome (their status-quo utility if the market is not revived) for the distribution of types who do not participate. The choice of a mechanism by the government therefore gives rise to a fixed-point problem: The set of types who stay out of the government's scheme defines payoffs in the marketplace, which in turn defines the set of types that stay out.
More formally, let U g (θ) and X g (θ) denote type θ's rent and allocation in the government's mechanism, and U m (θ; Θ m ) and X m (θ; Θ m ) his rent and allocation in the marketplace for subset Θ m of holdouts. In an endogenous participation constraint equilibrium for given rent profile U g (·), the sets of types who join the government intervention, Θ g , and of those who opt for the market, Θ m , are disjoint and satisfy
The government's task is then to find an incentive compatible mechanism X g (·) and resulting rent function U g (·) so as to maximize welfare subject to the constraint that the collated overall rent U(θ) and allocation X(θ) be the outcome of a (if possible unique) endogenous participation constraint equilibrium for rent profile U g (·) .
We characterize the optimal intervention, and show that authorities should not substitute fully for the market, even though they have no comparative disadvantage in acquiring assets or shares thereof. 4 It is suboptimal for the government to engage in a comprehensive intervention. Non-comprehensive schemes, by leaving some residual adverse selection in the marketplace, reduce the cost for the government of enabling refinancing. Thus, the name of the game is to reduce adverse selection enough to let the market rebound, but not too much, so as to limit the cost of intervention.
Another key result is that the voluntary participation constraint can be made costless through a proper choice of policy. That is, as long as the law forces the government not to expropriate property (sellers receive at least as much as they would obtain by keeping their legacy assets), there is no gain for the government from having the power to shut down the market; the presence of a market, though, deeply impacts the pattern
We first analyze in Section 3 the case of "outright sales" or "straight asset repurchases" or "buybacks", in which the seller keeps no skin in the game, which corresponds to situations in which only the owner can access the revenue on the legacy asset. Outright sales include for example government guarantees to revive securitization markets. Besides being of independent interest, this case illustrates a number of key insights in a straightforward manner. The optimal policy for a government confronting a market freeze is either laissez-faire or to intervene at at least a minimal scale.
If the government chooses to intervene, the intervention is necessarily expensive for the same reason Coase's durable good monopolist faces a particularly elastic demand curve: In both situations the principal creates its own competition. Here, by cleaning up the market from its more toxic pieces, the government revives the market and makes it attractive for the sellers not to join the government's initiative. In particular, at the optimal intervention the government strictly overpays for the legacy asset (and not only on average). Yet, and unlike what would be suggested by Coasian profit evasion, the existence of a later market imposes no welfare cost.
Interventions are more extensive when the government puts more weight on the seller's welfare or faces a smaller cost of public funds. We also extend the model to allow for an ex-ante choice of asset quality; unsurprisingly the prospect of government intervention creates moral hazard.
These insights all carry over to general mechanisms, in which the seller can retain some stake in the legacy asset. Section 4, which is of independent interest relative to the Rothschild-Stiglitz literature, studies laissez-faire; again the market either freezes or operates normally. In the latter case, we show that the "constrained efficient allocation", namely the one that yields the highest social surplus subject to seller incentive compatibility and buyer break-even constraint, is an equilibrium of the market game.
Furthermore this is the only equilibrium that survives a "robust choice" refinement.
This equilibrium is characterized by three regions:
For incentive reasons, sellers with low-quality legacy assets keep no skin in their legacy asset. This "outright sale" or "buyback" implies that the seller starts the new project with a clean slate.
Sellers with intermediate-quality legacy assets sell only a fraction of the legacy asset, in that their final reward depends on the outcome of the legacy asset: They keep some skin in the game.
Sellers with high-quality legacy assets keep them and are not refinanced.
Section 5 looks at optimal government intervention to revive a market that broke down. Because the possibility of requiring some "skin in the game" somewhat alleviates adverse selection, the optimal intervention is more extensive than under outright sales. Furthermore, the government cleans up the market, first through outright purchases of the weakest assets and then through some recapitalization, and leaves the agents with the strongest legacy assets to the market. Finally, at the optimum the government again loses money on all types who join the scheme.
Relationship to the literature
The paper most obviously builds on the literature on market breakdowns initiated by Akerlof (1970) ; see e.g. Hendel-Lizzeri (1999 , 2002 for dynamic extensions and Bolton et al (2009) , Kurlat (2010) , and Malherbe (2009) for recent applications to the financial crisis. Relatedly, the literature initiated by Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976 ) (e.g. Hellwig 1987 has looked at the existence and characterization of equilibria in screening models with divisibility and exclusivity. Attar et al (2009) show that the Akerlof outcome obtains under divisibility provided that relationships be non-exclusive. MaskinTirole (1992) characterizes equilibria of the signaling (informed principal) version of
Rothschild-Stiglitz models. 5 The entire literature however builds on the assumption of exogenous participation constraints (say, the absence of trade). This assumption is inappropriate when the market responds to the mechanism built by the designer.
The paper is also related to the literature on competitive price discrimination (e.g., Biais et al 2000 , Rochet-Stole 2002 , Biais-Mariotti 2005 , and Armstrong-Vickers 2001 in that participation constraints are endogenous to the equilibrium. In that literature, though, contract offers are simultaneous and so the reservation utilities are not affected by the mechanism chosen by the designer, who therefore takes them as exogenous. Put differently, the mechanism designer does not need to solve a fixed-point problem when building his own mechanism.
Landier-Ueda (2009) and Philippon-Schnabl (2009), and Aghion et al (1999) analyze the trade-offs involved in recapitalizing the banking sector under adverse selection and moral hazard, respectively. They consider compulsory schemes, in that banks are not allowed to refinance themselves in the marketplace if they don't participate in the government's mechanism. Again, the issue of mechanism-dependent participation constraint does not arise. Neither does it arise in the work on optimal securitization design (e.g., Aghion et al 2004 , Faure-Grimaud-Gromb 2004 .
The theme that regulation and markets feed back on each other has been developed by Faure-Grimaud in rather different contexts, in which, in contrast with this paper, regulation is not voluntary: In his 2002 contribution, the regulator uses stock information provided by the financial market in order to improve the regulatory scheme, which in turn affects stock price determination; his 1996 piece examines the regulation of predatory firms.
With the literature on auctions with externalities (starting with Katz-Shapiro 1986 and Jéhiel-Moldovanu 1996) , the paper shares the property that reservation utilities are mechanism dependent; that literature however does not emphasize informational The most closely related research is an independent contribution by Philippon and Skreta (2010) , who also look at the possibility that a subsequent market may constrain the optimal bailout policy and that rents in that market may increase the cost of intervention. In their model, both returns (legacy asset, new project) are observable; inspired by Innes (1990) , payments to investors are assumed to be monotonic in total return. The seller has two possible types and the focus is on interventions that refinance the two types. Philippon-Skreta shows that there is no cost for the government to refinance itself both types, 7 that there is no need for a menu (one size fits all), and that a debt guarantee in general dominates asset buybacks. My model has a continuum of types, and allows more generally for interventions that do not lead to universal refinancing. The optimal government intervention involves a two-piece menu of a buyback and a recapitalization, and it sorts out the bad types, leaving the better types to the market. I further show that there is no social gain from being able to foreclose the financial market and that the government loses money on all types it refinances directly.
Finally, and also closely related, the paper shares with the large literature on the durable good monopolist, initiated by Coase (1972) , the insight that the principal may create his own competition. We will later explain why, in contrast with Coasian profit evasion, welfare is not reduced by the prospect of a later market.
Model
a) Preferences and technology All parties are risk-neutral. A seller is cashless and protected by limited liability, owns a legacy asset, and has a new project to finance (or an old project in need of refinancing). Because she has no financial muscle of her own, she must rely on the sale of her legacy asset or on the issuance of securities backed by this asset in order to finance the project. Yet, as in Myers-Majluf (1984), 8 this process is marred with adverse selection. 7 In particular, it is strictly suboptimal for the government to take all the bad types out of the market because that increases the outside option. Since market beliefs are arbitrary when the government refinances both types, such comprehensive interventions would be very expensive if the refinement put much weight on the good type. There is a continuum of mixing equilibria that can achieve the same cost. Philippon and Skreta also look at a perturbation in which the seller faces a random cost to participate in the government scheme (like in section 5.3, except that in that section the cost is borne by the government), and so some types (a majority of good ones) drop out. Philippon and Skreta argue that the "all types participate" equilibrium captures the intuition of Paulson and others in October 2008 that allowing good types to drop out would increase the cost of convincing other banks to stay in.
8 Unlike in Myers-Majluf "fungibility case", though, we assume that separate claims can be written on the legacy asset and on the new project. This assumption will enable us to analyze buybacks, but will not impact the analysis: see Section 6. Legacy asset. A legacy asset pays off R 0 in case of success and 0 in case of failure.
The probability of success, θ, is known only to the seller, and is distributed according to some continuous cumulative distribution function F(θ) on [0, 1], with density f (θ) and mean θ. The distribution function F(θ) is assumed to be log-concave (its hazard rate f (θ)/F(θ) is decreasing).
The "legacy asset" can alternatively be interpreted as a nominal claim R 0 on a counterparty. The exposure parameter θ then reflects both the probability that the counterparty will be able to pay back and the fraction of the claim that can be recouped in bankruptcy.
New project. The new project is the same for all seller types. It involves an investment cost I and yields no income if the seller misbehaves, in which case she obtains a high private benefit B, but the new project has negative social value: B < I. It yields sure verifiable income R 1 and (nonpledgeable) private benefit b, 0 < b < B, if the entrepreneur behaves. 9 Let
denote the corresponding surplus. 10
Assumption 1 (positive NPV): S > 0.
The next assumption ensures that the seller cannot finance the project on a standalone basis and therefore must sell a stake in, or the full legacy asset in order to undertake the new project. In order to prevent the seller from misbehaving, the latter must have a financial stake B − b in the project's success. 11 The "pledgeable income" is therefore R 1 − (B − b). 9 The existence of credit rationing will hinge only on the property that B > 0. Assuming further that b > 0 will give scope for optimal interventions that do not necessarily imply universal refinancing; assuming B > b will imply that some outright sales (in which the seller keeps no skin in the game) are optimal even when the optimal mechanism is used. These properties do not complicate the analysis.
10 As usual, the NPV is assumed to be negative if the seller is induced to shirk: B < I. 11 As is standard, in order to avoid "openness problems" (and the concomitant need for approximate implementation), we will assume throughout the paper that, when indifferent, the seller behaves in the buyer's best interest.
Assumption 2 (scope for credit rationing): In the absence of legacy asset, the seller would be unable to secure financing:
The third assumption ensures that, under symmetric information, high-θ types would be able to obtain refinancing:
Assumption 3 (collateralization may enable financing): Collateral is valuable for the best types (θ close to 1) when they are recognized as such by the market:
The timing is summarized in Figure 1 . At stage 1, the seller privately learns θ, the probability of success of her legacy asset. At stage 2, buyers make contract offers. Then at stage 3, the seller chooses one or none of the offers. Payoffs are realized at stage 4. We will let U 0 (θ) denote the autarky utility. We will focus on the case of a fleeting opportunity/urgent need: The new investment opportunity or the need for cash requires an immediate (stage 3) action. Then
Remark : The analysis fully extends to the case of a less urgent need/Hirshleifer destructionof-insurance effect case, in which the investment opportunity is still available at stage 4, but will have to be financed under common knowledge about the realization of the legacy asset. 12 Fleeting opportunities simplify the formulas and exposition, and so we focus on them for expositional purposes.
d) Contracts
There is perfect competition among buyers i = 1, 2, · · · , ∞. Each buyer/financier i proposes a mechanism mapping a type announcement into an allocation: 13
A contract consists of a type-contingent fixed (independent of legacy project outcome) reward for the seller: z i ( θ) ≥ 0 a type-contingent reward that is conditioned on the success of the legacy project (skin in the game): y i ( θ) ≥ 0 14 a type-contingent investment decision for the new project:
Without loss of generality, the seller receives nothing when x i ( θ) = 1 and the 12 Because refinancing at stage 4 occurs only when the legacy asset pays off and the seller receives the entire surplus under a competitive capital market,
More generally, the need may be more or less urgent (for example due to discounting or to the possibility that a rival might step in and preempt between stages 3 and 4) and so
where 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1.
13 Alternatively, the seller could engage in signaling, as in Maskin-Tirole (1992) . We would let the seller offer a menu of allocations z( θ), y( θ), x( θ) contingent on the type-announcement θ made posterior to acceptance by the buyers. 14 In principle, y i (θ) could conceivably be negative without violating limited liability if z i (θ) > 0. But there is obviously no loss of generality involved in assuming that the contingent reward is non-negative. new project delivers no revenue. 15 Note also that we focus on deterministic contracts (x i ( θ) = 0 or 1). Besides being realistic, I conjecture that this assumption actually involves no loss of generality.
As usual, one can restrict attention to truthful mechanisms ( θ = θ). We let U i (θ) and π i (θ) denote the seller's utility and the buyer's profit under i's mechanism when the seller has type θ. e) Incentive compatibility
Note that all types receive utility at least B if the mechanism is non-trivial.
Note that (IC) requires that y(·) be non-decreasing; and that the gross rent function U(·) be a continuous, increasing and convex function. For conciseness we include individual rationality into the definition of incentive compatibility.
f) Definition of equilibrium 15 Let z i and y i denote the fixed and variable rewards when for some type θ, x i (θ) = 1 and the new project fails. These variables are irrelevant if the seller is induced to behave; so assume that she misbehaves. The seller could alternatively set these rewards to 0 and let
This alternative contract induces effort in the new project and delivers the same utility to the seller (for this particular type as well as any other type) and a higher profit to buyer i.
Because we later introduce offers by the government, we need to consider an ar- 
Θ i denotes buyer i's resulting clientele, i.e., the set of all types attracted by buyer i's offer (support of Θ i ⊆ θ|i ∈ arg max {j = 0,1,··· ,∞} U j (θ) ) and Θ 0 the set of buyers who do not contract with a buyer:
(ii) each buyer makes a non-negative expected profit:
(iii) were a buyer to deviate from his offer, there would exist an allocation of seller types that is individually rational for the seller (in the sense of (i)) and such that the buyer does not benefit from the deviation.
Note that the budget balance condition at the individual buyer level implies that the industry as a whole makes a non-negative profit:
where π(θ) is the profit made by the industry on type θ.
An "outcome" or "allocation" will refer to the real allocation {x(·), U(·)} and not to the financial transfers giving rise to this allocation.
Lemma 1 If the equilibrium outcome is trivial, then
A trivial mechanism creates no gain from trade. The proof of Lemma 1 is omitted, as it closely follows that of the no-trade theorem (e.g., Milgrom-Stokey 1982) . g) Buybacks (outright sales) Definition 4 (buybacks): A buyback or outright sale offer by a buyer satisfies y i (θ) = 0 for all θ (no skin in the game). By incentive compatibility
Outright sales correspond to an extreme case in which none of the cash flow R 0 attached to the legacy asset can be appropriated by non-owners. Furthermore, it can be shown that optimal buyer behavior implies that the seller receives t i = 0 in the absence of investment.
Finally, note that the offer z i associated with investment is equivalent to a purchase of the asset at price p i = z i + b − S ≥ B − S, and letting the seller be financed on the market (which is doable since p i + S − B ≥ 0); in either case the seller receives utility z i + b = p i + S (under the former policy, the seller receives on top of z i private benefit b). In the next section, we will without loss of generality assume that the buyers offer to purchase the asset and that the resulting monetary transfer serves as equity for new financing.
Buybacks
Let us first assume that the government and the market can only offer to buy the asset.
Thus the seller keeps either no skin in the game (contract with the government or with buyers) or a full share in the legacy asset (autarky). This case, besides its simplicity and its applications to various buyback and credit guarantee schemes, enables a clean analysis of the similarities and the differences with Coase's (1972) model of the durable good monopolist.
The timing goes as follows: First, the government offers to purchase the legacy asset at price p g . The seller then chooses whether to accept the government's offer. Second, the market (which exists only for those seller types who have turned down the government's offer) clears at some price p m .
Laissez-faire
In the absence of government intervention, the market breaks down (p m = 0) if there exists no price p such that: (i) "equity" p enables refinancing:
and (ii) buyers break even:
In order for a market to deliver something else than autarky, there must be gains from trade. Condition (i) says that a seller who collects p from the sale of her legacy asset and therefore has "equity" or "net worth" p to invest in the new project overcomes the shortage of pledgeable income hampering the financing of the new project. Thus, suppose that p + [S − B] ≥ 0 and so trading the legacy asset generates gains from trade S (the net surplus attached to the new project goes to the seller as the financial market is competitive). The seller then parts with her asset if her resulting welfare, p + S, exceeds the autarky utility U 0 (θ). Condition (ii) is the buyer's breakeven condition in the market for the legacy asset.
Conversely, if there are prices satisfying (i) and (ii), then the equilibrium price is the highest such price, namely the one that satisfies (ii) with equality. 17
Government intervention
Let us assume that there is no price satisfying (i) and (ii) (the analysis is similar if the market already operates under laissez-faire, but at an insufficient scale). The laissezfaire outcome is then the no-trade, autarky outcome. To revive the market, let the government offer to buy the asset at some price p g .
Remark : This asset repurchase intervention admits several, equivalent interpretations.
Instead of acquiring the assets, the authorities could, as the Financial Stability Board is currently considering to recommend to revive securitization, introduce credit guarantees or insurance to cover underlying assets. Insured assets then sell at R 0 in the market, and so the issuer receives an equivalent p g = R 0 − φ if φ is the fee charged by the government for the guarantee.
Lemma 2 : A government intervention that is non-trivial (enables some refinancing) and non-comprehensive (does not attract all types) always rejuvenates the market.
Proof : A non-trivial government intervention satisfies
Suppose a contrario that despite the government intervention, the market is still frozen, so the seller obtains U 0 (θ) if she turns down the government's offer. By accepting the government's offer, the seller obtains p g + S (because the capital market is competitive, the surplus goes to the seller). So the "cutoff type", θ g , satisfies
Let m(θ − , θ + ) denote the mean of the distribution when it is left-truncated at θ − and right-truncated at θ + , for any θ − ≤ θ + . 18 For
and is profitable if and only if:
.
Thus, a necessary and sufficient condition for the market not to restart is that at
Let us focus on non-trivial government interventions (p g + S ≥ B); in the Appendix, we check that setting p g < B − S is indeed suboptimal.
Proposition 1 (description of equilibrium) Consider (without loss of generality) a nontrivial government intervention (p g ≥ B − S). Then 
Types in (θ * , 1] keep their asset and are not refinanced;
(iii) the following describes an equilibrium behavior: types in [0, θ g ) join the government's scheme, and types in [θ g , θ * ] sell their legacy asset in the free market, where θ g is uniquely defined by:
Furthermore this is the unique equilibrium behavior in the limit of vanishingly small probability that an exogenous event forces the market to shut down after decisions to join the government's scheme have been made.
Proof : Finally, suppose that there is an arbitrarily small probability ε that an exogenous event forces the market to shut down just after government offers are accepted or refused. Then sorting prevails: higher θ types have a (small) relative preference for the market. And so a cutoff indeed exists. 20
The equilibrium allocation is summarized in Figure 2 . Let us next turn to the government's optimal policy. We let λ denote the shadow cost of public funds, and D denote the net cost of the intervention for the government. 20 Assume that with vanishingly small probability ε, bad news accrue as to the probability of success decreases: The new probability distribution is K( θ|θ), satisfying first-order stochastic dominance. The shock is sufficiently strong that the market breaks down. And so type θ prefers the market to the government if and only if:
The proof is straightforward.
The government's objective is then: 21
From Proposition 1 (which guarantees the possibility of implementing an allocation despite the presence of the market) and from the buyers' zero-profit condition, the presence of a free market imposes no social welfare cost, provided that it is embodied in the overall scheme. Namely, if the government wants to induce a cutoff θ * below which the seller is refinanced, it should not aim at a comprehensive intervention: Were θ g = θ * , then types above θ * would actually be refinanced by the market. Put differently, an intervention that is successful in facilitating refinancing must be expensive: It
The following proposition first compares the outcome with the one that prevails when the government can shut down market transactions ("foreclosed market"), but must respect private property ("no expropriation": the seller can refuse to participate and must therefore enjoy utility at least U 0 (θ)). The proposition then observes that an intervention, if it is optimal, must have a minimum scale. Finally, it characterizes the optimal intervention.
Proposition 2 (optimal intervention) (i) The presence of a free market does not reduce social welfare relative to the case in which the government has the power to shut down the market, but not to expropriate the seller, provided that the government anticipates that it creates its own competition by rejuvenating the market. The intervention should not be comprehensive.
(ii) There is a minimum scale of intervention (p g ≥ B − S), corresponding to the minimum extent of toxic asset clean up needed to revive the market.
(iii) As λ increases from 0 to ∞, the optimal policy involves, successively:
• All types are refinanced: θ * = 1.
• The optimal refinancing scope is given by an efficiency/rent-extraction trade-off:
When the solution given by (2) does not enable refinancing (U 0 (θ * ) < B):
• The government intervenes at the lowest scale consistent with refinancing
• There is no intervention (θ * = 0).
(iv) The government overpays with probability 1.
Proof : The government chooses a cutoff θ * , or equivalently a price p (= p g = p m ) satisfying
Using the buyers' zero-profit condition (and so
social welfare under a non-trivial government intervention is given by:
It is easy to check that ∂ 2 W/∂λ∂θ * < 0, and so the optimal θ * must be a nonincreasing function of λ. 22 Using the expression for the derivative of the right-truncated
and substituting for p, one obtains, in the case of an interior solution:
Because the distribution F is log-concave, there is at most one solution to equation (2).
If ∂W/∂θ * > 0 for all θ * < 1, then θ * = 1. Finally, a corner solution may also occur if the value θ * given by the first-order solution does not enable refinancing:
The optimal intervention is then either not to intervene (θ * = 0) or to intervene at the lowest scale consistent with refinancing (θ * = U −1 0 (B)). 23 (iv) Note, finally, that p g = m θ g , θ * R 0 > θR 0 for all θ ≤ θ g . Hence, the government overpays with probability 1.
Simple comparative statics show that interventions are more extensive (θ * increases) if public interventions are not too costly (the shadow cost of public funds decreases, or equivalently seller's welfare receives a higher weight in the social welfare function). 24 The idea that intervention requires a minimum scale resonates with the recent experience in securitization markets. Despite extensive intervention by central banks and governments to buy securitized assets directly or lend against them, most market segments have not witnessed a revival of private sector investment in such assets.
Ex-ante moral hazard
Let us extend the model by introducing a "stage 0", at which the seller chooses the asset quality. At private and unobserved cost Ψ(e), the seller generates distribution F(θ|e) such that ∂( f /F)/∂e > 0 and ∂( f /F)/∂θ < 0. The following proposition is proved in the Appendix. 23 There is no intervention for λ > λ, where λ is such that the increase in rents for types in [0, θ * = U −1 0 (B)] is equal to the deficit cost of repurchasing the asset at price p = B − S from these types:
Proposition 3
(i) Strategic substitutability. Consider an arbitrary (i.e., possibly out of equilibrium) expectation e * . Under ex-ante moral hazard, the seller chooses a higher effort (e) when expected to choose a lower one (e * ).
(ii) Consequently, there exists a unique equilibrium.
(iii) If there is an equilibrium intervention, effort is lower than in the absence of intervention.
Intuitively, if the equilibrium effort is high, interventions face less adverse selection and are more generous (higher p). This implies that the seller expects to be bailed out more often and so puts in less effort.
General sharing schemes in the market
When the return R 0 on the legacy asset is contractible and can be shared, buybacks only in general is no longer optimal. We now generalize the previous analysis to arbitrary sharing schemes.
As discussed in Section 2, we consider the timing in Figure 1 , but for an arbitrary posterior distribution Θ m (with corresponding cumulative distribution F m (·)).
We thereby study the "continuation game" that will be Consider the following condition for a given y:
The motivation for introducing this function stems from the following lemma, which plays a central role in the subsequent analysis.
Lemma 3 Consider an arbitrary incentive compatible mechanism with investment function x(·) and rent function U(·).
Let y denote the highest skin in the game among types who invest: y ≡ sup
{y(θ)}, and θ ≡ sup {θ|x(θ) = 1}. Let θ * ≡ inf {θ|U(θ) = U 0 (θ)}. 
such that the buyer profit on this mechanism is at most
Proof of Lemma 3:
(i) Consider a type θ > θ * . Then incentive compatibility implies that:
with strict inequality if type θ gets strictly more than his reservation utility. But type θ * must prefer his allocation to that of type θ, and so
Because there are no gains from trade for θ ≥ θ and a fortiori for θ ≥ v θ, buyer profit is bounded above by:
θ, the profit is bounded above by
Were Assumption 4 violated, then the market would function perfectly, in that all types would be refinanced (this is a consequence of the following analysis). So there would be no benefit from government intervention.
Lemma 4 Consider a non-trivial equilibrium. And let
In particular, the skin in the game can never exceed its no-trade level R 0 .
Proof : This is just a consequence of Assumption 4 and the fact that
(the reservation utility is not binding for any type) for all θ and so
Letting θ 0 (y) be defined by
So Π(y) is decreasing whenever y > R 0 − b. This, together with Assumption 4, implies that Π(y) < 0 for all y ≥ R 0 − b.
Proposition 4 (market breakdown)
If there exists no y satisfying (3), the unique equilibrium involves market breakdown:
Proof : Proposition 4 is a direct corollary of Lemma 3 (ii).
Let us now investigate the outcome when the set of y satisfying (3) is non-empty.
The (constrained) efficient allocation
Ignoring equilibrium considerations for the moment, let us look for the constrained efficient allocation, which is the one maximizing total (net) surplus
among those satisfying (IC) and (BB). This is also the allocation that would be selected by the seller and competitive buyers behind the veil of ignorance (the seller does not yet know the realization of θ) and under a seller ex post individual rationality constraint (the seller cannot commit to transfer the legacy asset).
If Π(y) < 0 for all y, then the constrained efficient allocation is the autarky one. So suppose that the set of y such that Π(y) ≥ 0 is non-empty.
Proposition 5 (constrained efficient allocation) Suppose that Π(y) ≥ 0 for some y. Let y m denote the highest value such that Π(y) ≥ 0. Among allocations that satisfy (BB) and (IC), the efficient one, that is the one with the highest total surplus, satisfies: Thus buyer profit is bounded above by
Total net surplus is thus bounded above by
an increasing function of The constrained efficient allocation is depicted in Figure 3 .
Lemma 5
In the constrained efficient allocation: (i) y m < R 0 , (ii) the buyers' type-contingent profit π(θ) is strictly increasing in θ for θ < θ * m .
Proof : (i) From Assumption 4, y m < R 0 − b, and so y m < R 0 .
(ii) One has
no skin in the game skin in the game 
Thus,
We now show that the constrained efficient allocation is an equilibrium outcome. 25
Proposition 6 (existence). The constrained efficient allocation is an equilibrium outcome.
Proof : Let all buyers offer the constrained efficient allocation and thereby attract a representative sample of the population. 26 A deviating buyer cannot make a profit by offering a trivial mechanism, which would create no gains from trade if the offer were taken up. Suppose therefore that a buyer offers a non-trivial, incentive compatible mechanism with utilities U * * (·), while equilibrium utilities are the piecewise linear U * (·) as in the constrained efficient allocation. Because the mechanism is non-trivial,
If θ * * ≥ θ * m , the convexity of U * * and the fact that the mechanism is non-trivial imply that either (i) U * * (θ) ≥ U * (θ) for all θ ≤ θ * * , and so for all θ ∈ (0, 1]. Furthermore x * * (θ) = 0 for θ > θ * * . Let all seller types select the deviating buyer's offer. The deviating buyer's profit is bounded above by
is non-positive from the constrained efficiency of U * (·);
The latter implies that x * * (θ) = 0 for θ ∈ (θ 2 , θ * * ], because otherwise (i) would obtain: Indeed, suppose that x * * (θ) = 1 for some θ > θ 2 . Then because U * * is convex, dU * * (θ)/dθ = y(θ) ≥ y m and so
as well, a contradiction. The mechanism may also attract some types θ > θ * * , but we know that such types do not bring in any profit as x * * (θ) = 0 from Lemma 3. So the mechanism cannot make money from the seller on [θ 2 , 1] and does not attract Finally, when θ * * < θ * m , the proof in part (ii) of the case θ * * ≥ θ * m still applies and so, again, the deviating buyer cannot make a positive profit.
Equilibrium selection
In Section 5, we will take the constrained efficient outcome to be the continuation equilibrium of the subform in which the seller has decided not to accept the government's offer and the market assigns posterior beliefs F m (·) to the seller's type. Although this selection may involve a slightly optimistic view of how markets function, this equilibrium is the unique equilibrium outcome under the following "robust choice" refinement:
Robust choice: Consider two IC utility schedules U(·) and U(·). Suppose that U(θ
One motivation for this refinement goes as follows: Suppose that the seller faces vanishingly small uncertainty about her type such that f (θ|θ 0 )/ f (θ ′ |θ 0 ) −→ 0 for θ > θ ′ ≥ θ 0 . Then choosing U(·) dominates choosing U(·) before the limit is reached. Robust choice is thus (much stronger than but) in the spirit of the elimination of weakly dominated strategies. From the proof of Proposition 6, the constrained efficiency allocation is an equilibrium outcome consistent with robust choice. The following result, proved in the Appendix, shows that this is the unique such equilibrium allocation:
Proposition 7 Under robust choice, the unique equilibrium outcome is the constrained efficient outcome.
Market rejuvenation
Description of government intervention a) Mechanisms
The government builds a voluntary-participation mechanism. Although we will see that the optimal scheme admits a simple interpretation in terms of asset purchases and recapitalizations, we keep this scheme abstract and general at this stage. A scheme consists in the choice of a subset Θ g of types in [0, 1] who participate in the scheme, and for each type θ in Θ g , a financing decision x g (θ) ∈ {0, 1} for the new project, and fixed payment z g (θ) (independent of the outcome of the legacy asset) and contingent payment y g (θ) if the legacy project succeeds, both conditional on the new project succeeding if x g (θ) = 1. The seller receives 0 if the new project is financed and fails. Let x m (θ) ∈ {0, 1} describe the financing decision in the market for types in Θ m and
A seller with type θ in [0, 1] derives utility U g (θ) from participating in the government's scheme:
The function U g (·) is increasing and convex. Incentive compatibility implies that
if there exists at least one type θ ′ such that x g (θ ′ ) = 1. An intervention that satisfies (5), (6) and U g (θ) ≥ U 0 (θ) for all θ is said to be incentive compatible.
b) Timing The timing is described in Figure 4 . c) Equilibrium definition In the following we will without loss of generality focus on outcomes such that at least some type receives financing (from the market or the government) for the new project. Otherwise, the positive cost of public funds makes laissez-faire optimal. 
The seller accepts one of the offers or chooses to keep her legacy asset and to not be financed.
6
Outcome of legacy asset realized. Contracts are implemented.
if the seller has turned down the government's offer Definition 5 (equilibrium with government intervention). Consider an incentive compatible intervention {U g (·)}. An equilibrium is an allocation of types
and associated market equilibrium {U m (·)} corresponding to the constrained equilibrium allocation for posterior beliefs defined by
Recall that the government faces a shadow cost λ of public funds and maximizes expected gross social surplus
where D is the deficit and π the buyers' expected profit (π ≥ 0). Social welfare satisfies: 27
Finally, use the fact that buyers at least break even (π ≥ 0; actually they just break even, as seen in Section 4).
Definition 6 (comprehensive intervention). A government intervention is comprehensive if all types for which x(θ) = 1 accept the government's offer.
Optimal intervention: an upper bound on social welfare
Our strategy will consist in, first, looking for an upper bound on social welfare and, second, showing that this upper bound can be implemented through a simple government intervention. We look at the combined (government plus market) alloca-
for all θ, reducing the rents U(·) by a uniform ε would increase the upper bound while preserving incentive compatibility). From Lemma 3, x(θ) = 0 for θ > θ * . In order to maximize welfare below θ * :
where, as earlier, y ≡ sup {θ|x(θ) = 1} {y(θ)}.
An upper bound on welfare is therefore:
[We will later show that for the optimal policy W = W(θ * )]. Letting θ 0 be defined by
The rent is equal to B below θ 0 (y) and to
The first term in this derivative represents the efficiency gain from refinancing more types, while the second term stands for the increased rent for types in [θ 0 (θ * ), θ * ] from the necessary increase in the skin of the game. Because public funds are costly (λ > 0), this increase in rent represents a social cost. This rent extraction-efficiency tradeoff is illustrated in Figure 5 .
From this, we infer that at the optimum
V(θy)
Figure 5: rent extraction-efficiency tradeoff
The next proposition characterizes the upper bound on social welfare, that is, in view of the following, implementability proposition, the optimal intervention.
Proposition 8 (comparative statics). The optimal intervention: (i) involves some refinancing if λ < λ 1 and is laissez-faire (no intervention) if λ > λ 1 , for some λ 1 ;
(ii) unless it is laissez-faire, always involves a region with a clean-up of the balance sheet/buybacks (U 0 (θ) = B) and a region in which the seller keeps some skin in the game (θ 0 (θ * ) < θ * );
(iii) is more extensive (θ * increases), the lower the cost of public funds (λ), and the higher the social value of the new project (S);
(iv) is more extensive under good news about the prior distribution (in the sense of MLRP:
(v) is more extensive than under outright sales.
Proof : Only (iv) and (v) require some elaboration.
(iv) Note that
Under good news about the prior distribution, f (θ)/ f (θ * ) decreases and so ∂W/∂θ * is positive over a wider range of θ * s.
(v) Recall the first-order condition under pure buybacks:
To show that θ * is higher under a general scheme, we note that
Indeed, the right-hand side of this inequality is bounded above by
Thus, we need to show that at the optimum of the outright sales mechanism:
The LHS of this inequality exceeds 1 since θ * R 0 = b + θ * y. The RHS is always smaller than 1.
That rescues are more extensive than under outright sales is natural: The possibility of asking the seller to keep some skin in the game alleviates adverse selection and makes the intervention less costly. Note also that we define the scope of intervention as the fraction of sellers who are financed (F(θ * )) and not as the government deficit.
Implementation
Let us next note that the optimal intervention always can take the form of a cleaningup of the worst types followed by refinancing of (some of) the remaining ones by the market. Furthermore, and as illustrated in Figure 6 , it must in general be the case that the intervention be non-comprehensive (i.e., does not cover all types in [0, θ * ]), even if there is no transaction cost involved in the intervention. The reason for this is that the market, if confronted with a population [θ * , 1] would in general want to refinance at least a fraction of these types. Anticipating this, types in [0, θ * ] would refrain from joining the government's scheme. 
Proof :
0 from our assumption that the market breaks down in the absence of intervention.
Thus there exists a (unique) solution to (7).
Suppose that θ g > θ 0 (θ * ) (where b + y * θ 0 (θ * ) = B: see Figure 6 ). Then by giving two incentive schemes {z = ε, y = y * − η} such that ε = θ g η and {z = B − b + κ, y = 0}, the government attracts types [0, θ g ] and only those types. When ε, η and κ converge to 0, the solution converges to the optimum. Thus, the optimum can be approximated through a scheme yielding a unique continuation equilibrium. One gets exact implementation for ε = η = κ = 0, but then the equilibrium set of types accepting the government offer is not necessarily [0, θ g ]; the allocation however is unique. 28 Finally, when θ g ≤ θ 0 (θ * ), then the equilibrium allocation is again unique.
Debate on the cost of interventions. One might conjecture that interventions should be reasonably cheap as sellers are eager to be refinanced and so are willing to part with their legacy asset at a low price. This high willingness to sell, though, is already accounted for by the market, that nonetheless has broken down. In fact, the government at the optimum policy always (and not only on average) overpays for the legacy asset or the stake: From (7) and the fact that profit is increasing in θ (Lemma 5(ii)),
Ex ante moral hazard
As in the case of outright sales, we can add a stage, stage 0, at which the seller chooses the distribution F(θ|e) at increasing and convex cost ψ(e). The effort increases the distribution in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. The equilibrium utility U(θ, e * ) is given by the socially optimal rent for distribution F(θ|e * ) corresponding to the equilibrium effort e * .
Proposition 10 : Suppose that the market breaks down in the absence of intervention and that the optimal government policy is not laissez-faire. The equilibrium effort is smaller under a government intervention than under laissez-faire.
Proof : Under an intervention the seller chooses her effort e so as to maximize:
while the laissez-faire effort is given by the maximization of
But U(θ, e * ) ∈ 0, y, U 0 (θ) where U 0 (θ) > y. By supermodularity, the optimal effort under laissez-faire is higher than under intervention.
Adding a cost of government intervention
Interventions by the government involve multiple costs: administrative costs and political backlash (increasing with the size of the intervention) for the government, political constraints (cap on bonuses, ...) and stigma of participation for the rescued entity.
We do not attempt to embody all these potential costs into the analysis. Rather, we content ourselves with the following exercise: Suppose that the government incurs an
what is the optimal pattern of intervention?
Proposition 11 As the unit cost of intervention ε converges to 0, the optimal intervention converges to the one characterized in Proposition 8. Furthermore, there is a unique implementation outcome: There exists θ g (given by (8)) such that types θ < θ g are rescued by the government, types θ in [θ g , θ * ] are refinanced by the market.
Intuitively, the size of the free market is maximized if the government rescues the worst types: this leaves more profitable types to, and therefore expands the market.
Proof : Let ξ g (θ) = 1 if θ ∈ Θ g and ξ g (0) = 0 otherwise. Let
denote the size of government involvement. Welfare can now be rewritten as
where π(θ) is the monetary outcome on type θ (π(θ) + U(θ) = θR 0 + Sx(θ)). The maximization of (8) subject to the (IC) constraint and
is a priori complex.
But consider any possible intervention and corresponding Θ g and Θ m . Let {x(·), U(·)} be the combined (government plus market) mechanism faced by the seller. Consider having the government deviate to offer the same mechanism {x(·), U(·)} and asking precisely the types in Θ g to participate in the government's scheme. This is incentivecompatible and produces exactly the same welfare and intervention costs as before.
So without loss of generality we can restrict attention to strategy profiles where the government offers the same mechanism as the market (but attracts only a subset of types). So, letting π(θ) ≡ θR 0 + S − V(θy) where y is the skin in the game offered by the market. We can now without loss of generality solve:
The Lagrangian of this optimization problem is −ε − µ π(θ). Because π(θ) is strictly increasing (from Lemma 5), there is indeed a cutoff θ g such that ξ g (θ) = 1 if and only if θ < θ g . Finally, the theorem of the maximum guarantees that as ε converges to 0, the optimum converges to the mechanism of subsection 5.2.
Discussion
Other causes of freezing. We have derived the implications of a common factor of market dry-up, adverse selection. The widespread focus on toxic assets, lack of trust, counterparty risk and losses associated with inaccurate ratings all suggest that accurate information is not widely available prior to bailouts. But market freezes are reinforced by other factors, such as some 29 regulated banks' strategies to avoid recognizing losses and having to raise more capital, the shortage of financial muscle, 30 heterogenous beliefs or ambiguity aversion. 31 . The nature of optimal interventions, if any, depends on the freeze's proximate cause. Consider, for example, a regulated entity subject to a capital adequacy requirement and owning an illiquid legacy asset subject to, and overvalued by historical cost accounting. Either potential buyers don't know the value of the asset and the adverse selection issues studied in this paper are relevant. Or they do and so auctioning off the asset on the market (de facto imposing fair value accounting), together with liquidity support -of [B − S − θR 0 ] in our model -should prevail. If there is a very limited set of potential buyers and so the government is worried about collusion (a sale at a favorable price so as to boost government subsidies), then the analysis resembles that of adverse selection developed in this paper.
Asset fungibility. Our basic model resembles Myers-Majluf (1984) 's, except that, to be able to discuss buyouts, we assumed that the legacy asset and the new project can be separated (are non-fungible). Let us briefly discuss the implications of fungibility; to remain in the spirit of Myers-Majluf, assume that R 0 = R 1 , so in case only one activity succeeds, investors cannot know whether it is the legacy asset or the new project. An incentive scheme then specifies a fixed transfer, and rewards for one or two successes.
Letting y(θ) denote the reward for two successes, t(θ) the reward for one success (conditional on the new project being financed), and t and y denote the highest such values,
The constrained-efficient allocation is slightly different from the one under nonfungibility. For example, if θ = 0 is to be financed and to not shirk, t ≥ B − b, and so for all θ, U(θ) ≥ B + θ(B − b): the initial flat part of the constrained optimum is now positively sloped. I conjecture that the paper's main results carry over. 29 Diamond and Rajan (2009) point out that in the recent crisis a number of regulated institutions had excess book capital. 30 There is now a large literature, starting with Allen-Gale (1994) , on the idea that prospective buyers able to manage the asset are in limited number and may not have enough capital to purchase the asset.
31 Caballero-Krishnamurthy (2008) .
Alleys for future research
The introduction already summarized the main insights. Let us discuss some other applications and alleys for future research.
Private-sector principals and market tainting strategies. Mechanism-dependent participation constraints also naturally arise in industrial organization, as when a dominant firm with market power designs a non-linear tariff, knowing that a competitive fringe of rivals will react with their own policies. Situations in which a dominant operator moves first in a market marred by adverse selection include market segmentation by a manufacturer or the selection of a clientele (through pricing and conditions) by a venture capitalist, investment bank or rating agency. Like in this paper, a high-rent policy inside the scheme raises the agent's outside option through a selection effect. The essential difference, though, is that the principal would strictly gain from the absence of a market: While the market delivers too small an agent's rent in my framework, it delivers (from the point of view of the principal) too high a rent in the market tainting application. By focusing on simultaneous offers, the competitive screening literature has ignored the mechanism-dependent participation constraint problem. This is an important alley for future research.
Contracting with externalities. Contracts often exert externalities on parties not involved in the contract (see Segal (1999) 's classic survey). "Contracting with externalities" is usually studied in symmetric information contexts, or ones in which externalities are independent of private information. But it is easy to envision situations in which exactly what types turn down contract offers affects one's willingness to contract: In general, who tenders the shares, and not only how many shares are tendered, matters for the post-takeover outcome if monitoring or dissonance are relevant. In a non-excludable public good model, an agent's outside option may depend on who agrees to contribute to the public good if some unverifiable effort or contract incompleteness prevent an accurate ex-ante specification of contributions. The payoff to belonging to or staying out of a cartel depends on privately-known marginal costs. 32 In these examples, and many others, participation constraints are endogenous.
Limited commitment. We have assumed that the government can commit to a rescue scheme. If the government cannot commit not to renegotiate, the sellers will adopt a lower take-up rate and some will wait for a better offer later on. The protracted recapitalization of Japanese banks is an interesting case in point (Hoshi-Kashyap 2010) .
This situation, in the absence of a market has been studied in the literature, 33 and has been shown to lead to a slower revelation of information and equilibrium delays. The novelty here is that a market can open over time. The interaction between renewed government offers and market opening is an exciting topic for future research.
Multi-sector analysis. Another limit to government intervention is that it may indirectly benefit sectors which the government does not intend to rescue or just help. For example, the government might want to rescue banks because they have small depositors or because they are central to the credit and payment systems. But it may not want to commit taxpayer money to the benefit of hedge funds. Yet if assets can be traded between hedge funds and banks, banks are willing to purchase dubious assets (assets they don't know the value of) from hedge funds given that they can then benefit from the government's asset repurchase scheme. If this arbitrage does not discourage the government from intervening, the government may then subsidize hedge funds or banks without need for cash or both.
These and other exciting research alleys related to mechanisms with endogenous participation constraints are left for future research.
33 E.g., Dewatripont (1989) , Laffont-Tirole (1990) and Hart-Tirole (1988) .
p m = B − S with probability α and the market breaks down with probability 1 − α such that
Finally,
Welfare is
W is linear in α (p g is a function of α, whereas all the other variables are being held constant as α varies). If W decreases with α, then it is bounded above by If W increases with α, the maximum is achieved at α = 1. The intervention then coincides with the minimum non-trivial intervention, except that there is no investment for types below θ g ; hence this intervention is dominated by doing the minimal non-trivial intervention and investing for all participating sellers.
Proof of Proposition 3
(i) For conciseness let us restrict our attention to the region of parameters for which an interior solution prevails:
f (θ * |e * ) F(θ * |e * ) = λR 0 (1 + λ)S . (ii) Uniqueness of equilibrium, if it exists, is a corollary of (i). Consider e = R(e * )
given by Ψ ′ (e) = R 0 1 θ * (e * )
− F e (θ|e) dθ. The equilibrium may involve mixed strategies by the government if at the level e at which the government is indifferent between an intervention and laissez-faire, R( e) < e. The equilibrium then has e = e and randomization by the government between intervention and laissez-faire. 
Proof of Proposition 7
Consider the upper envelope of the equilibrium utilities offered by the buyers:
As earlier, let y = sup {i, θ|x i (θ) = 1} y i (θ) and θ ≡ sup {θ, i} θ|x i (θ) = 1 . So let us assume that v y < y m and so, a fortiori, y < y m . Because x(θ) = 0 for θ ∈ [ θ, θ * ], the profit made by buyers on those types is strictly negative. Furthermore, it must be the case that θR 0 + S − U(θ) > 0 on an interval [ θ − ε, θ] for some ε > 0. 35 Suppose first that z > 0 and consider an "entering buyer" (by this we mean a buyer with a zero or arbitrarily small equilibrium profit, as we will show that the proposed contract makes a strictly positive profit) offering a single skin-in-the-game contract specifying {z − κ, y + η, x = 1} 36 defining a schedule U(θ) = max {B, z − κ + (y + η)θ + b, U 0 (θ)}, such that η > 0 and
The buyer then attracts at least types in [ θ − ε, θ], which by continuity yields a strictly positive profit for (ε, η, κ) small. He may also attract types in [ θ, θ * ], which a fortiori are profitable. He does not attract any type below θ − ε. Hence the deviation is strictly profitable.
Suppose finally that z = 0. Let the deviating buyer make a single skin-in-thegame offer {0, y + η, x = 1}. From robust choice this schedule attracts exactly types in [θ * * , θ * ] with θ * * < θ, as well as some (profitable) types above θ * . But even if θ * * = 0, this deviation is strictly profitable since y + η < y m for η small. 35 Recall that by convexity of U(·):
Furthermore, π(θ) ≤ θR 0 + S − U(θ); so if θR 0 + S − U( θ) ≤ 0, the buyers' profit is strictly negative. 36 It is also possible to upset the equilibrium through a contract specifying the same z.
